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Introduction
Performance measurement is a key issue both in the basic agency model and in subsequent theoretical extensions (for a review of theoretical work see, for example, Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Prendergast, 1999; or Raith, 2008) . More specifically, incentive theory establishes that the optimal intensity of incentives (that is, the proportion that variable pay represents in total compensation) depends on the properties of performance measures. For example, a body of research concludes that the design of incentives should be based on the informativeness principle. According to this principle any (costless) measure that adds information about workers' effort should be used in compensation contracts 1 .
In the last few years, empirical work has addressed the influence of performance measurement on incentive intensity (see Zenger and Marshall, 2000; Bowens and Van Lent, 2006; Gibbs et al., 2009; Kauhanen and Napari, 2012, among others) . Despite the advances made by these recent studies, empirical work on this issue is still scarce, and much remains to be learned about how the decision to implement low or high powered incentives is made. Consequently, it is still not clear how organizations actually design their incentive schemes. In addition, the way incentives are implemented does not always match the theoretical predictions, as occurs with the informativeness principle previously mentioned (see Raith, 2008) .
One of the main difficulties faced by the study on the determinants of incentive intensity is the lack of comprehensive data on how organizations actually design their incentive systems. As a consequence, work on the topic present certain limitations. For example, some authors include the number of performance measures as a determinant of intensity, but they do not consider the influence of specific measures and their properties (see Zenger and Marshall, 2000) . Others take into account only certain properties of performance measures, such as risk and distortion (see Bowens and Van Lent, 2006) . Certain analyses focus on the examination of case studies (see for example Gibbs et al., 2009) , while others do not make in-depth studies of the implications of performance measurement for incentive intensity. For example, Kauhanen and Napari (2012) have extensive information about performance measures and measurement levels, but they only focus on the descriptive analysis of such information.
Our aim here is to complement this empirical research and examine the influence that performance measurement exerts on the intensity of incentives. In order to do so, we address two specific questions. First, we examine how the measurement level influences incentive intensity. The choice of the measurement level 4 is one of the relevant dimensions employers have to consider when designing their incentive schemes (see Baker, 2002) . As Zenger and Marshall (2000) suggest, individual and collective incentives have different properties in terms of noise, distortion, and other attributes. For example, the adoption of group or plant incentives could help to solve potential problems such as distorted behavior by the worker. Consequently, we expect to find differences in the intensity of incentives depending on the organizational level of performance measurement.
Second, we take into account a broad set of measures and examine their influence on intensity for individual incentives, group incentives, and plant or firm incentives. Many studies on the topic analyze more vague categories such as financial and non-financial measures (see Ittner and Larcker, 2002) . In this work, our main aim is to consider a set of indicators that comprehensively represents the measurement options available to employers. We think that our group of measures captures the specific attributes of the measurement process with precision. Consequently, we are able to carry out a detailed analysis of the determinants of incentive intensity. As we have already mentioned, we perform this analysis for the three different measurement levels available to organizations: individual group and plant or firm. We are not aware of previous work that analyses the relationship between performance measurement and incentive intensity in such an exhaustive way. Since the design of incentives at different levels may be driven by different forces, we go a step further in the study of the practice and examine the determinants of incentive intensity from a comprehensive perspective.
The analysis is based on a unique data set that contains extensive information on the provision of incentives in manufacturing establishments. More specifically, it includes data about the use of pay for performance (from now on, PfP), and about the use of PfP measured at individual (Individual PfP), group (Group PfP) and plant or firm (Plant or Firm PfP) levels. Regarding incentive intensity, the data reports on the proportion of total pay that depends on performance for each PfP scheme. In addition, it specifies which measures are used to determine performance, and contain information about a set of 11 indicators. To our knowledge, our data set constitutes a unique source of information about the relationship between PfP intensity and the use of performance measures at the three broad levels at which PfP can be implemented.
In order to study this relationship, our empirical strategy is as follows. has a positive effect on the intensity of incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the factors that, according to the theory, determine the intensity of incentives. Section 3 deals with the level of performance measurement and its relationship with intensity.
In Section 4, we analyze the indicators used to measure performance and their
properties. The next section describes the data set used in this study, and Section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis. In the last section we draw some conclusions.
The determinants of incentive intensity
From the literature on incentive provision and performance measure properties, we compile a set of factors that may influence incentive intensity. We begin by examining the agency model, which is the classic framework for understanding the provision of incentives in organizations (see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999) .
The central point of this model is the tradeoff between risk and incentives. The maximization problem for determining the optimal bonus rate concludes that intensity is negatively related to the agent's risk aversion, to the uncertainty in the production process and to the rate at which the marginal cost of effort increases. This framework reveals a relevant influence on incentive intensity for the purposes of our study: noise. When noise is high, the principal should increase wages to compensate workers for the risk they are exposed to (see Prendergast, 1999) . From these ideas, we identify noise as the first relevant determinant of incentive intensity. More precisely, agency theory predicts a decrease of incentive intensity when noise in the production process is high.
The recent literature on incentive intensity makes a distinction between uncontrollable and controllable risk 6 (see Gibbs et al., 2009 and Kauhanen and Napari, 2012; among others) . On the one hand, uncontrollable risk refers to noise, that is, those environmental factors that workers are unable to control. On the other hand, controllable risk refers to the actions a worker can take to respond to risk, which depend on the worker's specific knowledge or her private information (see Kauhanen and Napari, 2012) . In other words, this factor alludes to the extent workers can respond to uncertainty (see Gibbs et al., 2009) . The relevance of distinguishing between the two types of risk lies in their influence on incentive intensity. In the presence of controllable risk, incentives are useful because they motivate workers to use their private information when changes in the environment occur. Therefore, controllable risk should foster incentive intensity in order to enhance workers to act in the organization's best interest.
Another extension to the basic agency model that is useful for the purposes of our analysis is that proposed by Baker (1992) . This author pointed out the difference between the worker's measured performance and the worker's total contribution to firm value, which are assumed to be the same in the baseline model. According to this model, if measured performance is highly correlated with firm value, the principal should set strong incentives (high intensity). On the contrary, a low association between measured performance and organizational value renders low incentives optimal. Consequently, the link between measured performance and firm value should be a relevant determinant of incentive intensity. For example, the connection between workers' performance and firm value varies between jobs, since certain positions have a higher impact on organizational value than others. Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas (1998) show that this impact becomes less straightforward as we move down the organizational hierarchy, decreasing from top executives to middle managers. Hence, the intensity of incentives should be higher for those jobs whose performance has a high influence on firm value.
The literature on incentive provision also makes reference to the idea of distortion (see Kauhanen and Napari, 2012) or dysfunctional behavior (Prendergast, 1999) . The problem of distortion emerges when the principal rewards the wrong behavior (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992) . This problem is particularly prevalent when multitasking is present, leading agents to focus on some tasks more than on others. For example, rewarding volume may incentivize workers to put relevant dimensions of performance, such as quality or cooperation with other workers, aside. As Baker et al. (1994) pointed out, "firms get what they pay for". Consequently, incentives should be carefully designed in order to limit the occurrence of 7 dysfunctional behavior. Regarding the size of variable pay, the possibility of distortion should diminish intensity.
Finally, incentive provision may suffer from a problem of manipulation of performance measures. This problem emerges when workers scam the incentive scheme, increasing their performance ratings without improving organizational value (see Gibbs et al., 2009) . For example, they can manipulate performance standards concerning production time or volume. Due to the presence of information asymmetries, it might be difficult for the principal to verify these standards and set optimal incentives. Manipulation could also occur when subjective measures of performance are used in incentive schemes. In this case, the agent may bias the measurement process, thus earning the favor of the superior (see Prendergast, 1999) . Consequently, potential manipulability should be negatively correlated with incentive intensity. Table 1 summarizes the effects of all the factors described on the intensity of incentives.
[ 
The Organizational Level of Performance Measurement
A necessary condition for the use of pay for performance is the existence of measured performance (see Prendergast, 1999) . Therefore, one of the first issues organizations face when designing compensation schemes concerns the measurement level (see Baker, 2002) . In some cases, output is easily measured in individual terms, which enhances the use of schemes that reward individual performance. When performance measurement at the individual level is difficult or costly, collective measures may be used. As Zenger and Marshall (2000) point out, the adoption of collective incentive schemes allows organizations to provide highpowered incentives when individual schemes are difficult to use. Collective incentives could help to mitigate potential problems such as distorted behavior by the worker. In addition, the combination of individual and collective incentives may bring the design of incentives closer to its optimal configuration in a firm.
In this paper, we consider the use of the three levels at which performance can be measured: Individual PfP, Regarding Noise, we expect that it increases with the level of performance measurement. As Zenger and Marshall (2000) point out, it is more difficult for the employee to control performance measured at high organizational levels in relation to performance determined at low levels. In collective incentive schemes, performance depends on the actions taken by all members of the group. Furthermore, collective incentives are implemented in settings where teamwork and cooperation are required (see Jirjahn, 2002) . These working environments are characterized by the existence of interdependencies between workers, a wider variety of tasks and, in general, more complex and uncertain work settings. Hence, due to the complexity existing in these environments, workers are subject to risk since their compensation depends on factors they are unable to control (see Baker, 2002) . Overall, the degree of uncontrollable uncertainty should increase from
Individual PfP (lower Noise) to Plan or Firm PfP (higher Noise).
As we have previously mentioned, Controllable Risk should foster incentive intensity. Our intuition is that the workers' scope of action when facing uncertainty is higher if performance is measured at the individual level. On the contrary, a measure of collective performance, either at group, plant or firm level, depends on the specific knowledge and private information of multiple agents. Consequently, the set of actions an individual worker can take to respond to uncertain situations should be lower in comparison to individual incentive schemes. To sum up, we expect the degree of Controllable Risk to be higher in individual incentive schemes than in group or plant schemes.
Another relevant factor in the evaluation of the intensity of optimal incentives is the Impact on Firm Value, i.e. the impact of measured performance on the firm's goals. If this relationship is weak, incentives should be low powered (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999) . Regarding the measurement level, we presume that the relationship between measured performance and the contribution to firm value increases from Individual PfP to Plant or Firm PfP. Intuitively, when aspects such as the volume of production or its quality are measured at the plant or firm level, these measures are a good representation of firm value. On the contrary, measurements of volume or quality at the individual level have a lower impact on organizational value.
As regards Distortion, the use of group incentive schemes may help to mitigate dysfunctional behavior responses. In particular, collective incentives may reduce specific problems associated with the use of 9 individual measures of performance. For example, teamwork and cooperation frequently help to improve performance. However, individual rewards reduce incentives to cooperate (see Baker, 2002) . This dysfunctional behavior could be alleviated if collective incentives are introduced. Similarly, the use of pay linked to plant or firm results may help to avoid distortions associated with the provision of individual incentives. Overall, our idea is that Distortion decreases from Individual PfP to Plant or Firm PfP.
Finally, we expect the problem of Manipulability of performance measures to vary with the level of measurement. This problem arises when workers take advantage of information asymmetries to increase their performance ratings without improving firm value. We anticipate that the ability of a worker to manipulate game a measure will decrease from individual incentives to collective schemes. For example, it is easier for a worker to manipulate volume standards when production is measured individually. However, if collective incentives are used, it becomes implausible that workers can game these standards, or manipulate any other dimension of performance. All these ideas concerning the determinants of incentive intensity and the measurement level are summarized in the following table.
[ Manipulability. Finally, Group PfP is at the center of our ranking regarding the five properties. This characterization of PfP schemes makes it difficult to draw conclusions about their influence on intensity.
Overall, Plant or Firm PfP display better properties than Individual PfP. However, it may also be true that employers give more importance to some characteristics (e.g. reducing noise problems) than others. The empirical analysis will shed more light on the relationship between the measurement level and incentive intensity.
Properties of Performance Measures
In this section, we characterize a set of performance measures in terms of their degree of On the other hand, financial measures are more closely related to the firm's value, but workers have only limited control over them. In addition to these three factors we incorporate subjective indicators (Subjective Category) in our classification. We think this category is worth considering when grouping performance measures. On the one hand, subjective measures are widely used by organizations because they help to solve the deficiencies in objective measurement, such as the presence of noise (see Bol and Smith, 2011 The literature on performance measurement has considered other classifications besides the one we employ in this study. Among the most frequently used we find the distinction between financial and non-financial measures, that between broad and narrow measures or between input and output measures (for a review of different classification schemes see, for example, Ittner and Larcker, 2002) . However, we consider that our choice of the four different categories mentioned is a more exhaustive representation of measurement options. Instead of focusing on comparing two broad measurement schemes (financial vs. non-financial, or input vs. output) we go a step further and compare the effects on incentive intensity of four different categories of performance dimensions. Hence, we avoid the limitations associated with the use of more vague classification schemes, such as the failure to account for characteristics like the specific activities (productivity, absenteeism, customer satisfaction, etc.) that the measure accounts for (see Ittner and Larcker, 2002) . In what follows, we describe the properties of each category of measures.
Noise
Focusing on the first property, the Results Category provides some sources of Noise that should be considered when designing incentive schemes. Measures such as Productivity, Volume or Quality depend on uncontrollable factors to a certain extent. For example, they are influenced by technology. The productivity of an employee also depends on the results of colleagues or the decisions taken by superiors. On the other hand, the measures included in the HRM Outcomes Category may be beneficial to reduce potential sources of Noise in performance measurement. When incentives are based on aspects such as absenteeism, punctuality or injuries, for which a lower level of uncontrollable risk is involved, the problem of Noise becomes less prevalent.
Measures included in the Subjective Category are claimed to provide a comprehensive picture of performance (see Prendergast, 1999) . Since they are based on assessments of multiple dimensions, these measures reduce Noise in the evaluation process. More precisely, one of the main reasons for using subjective measures is the risk associated with objective indicators (Baker, 1994) . This idea is also tested by Bol and Smith (2011) . By means of an experiment, these authors show that supervisors use subjective measures to compensate for the deficiencies in objective measurement and, in particular, to offset the negative effects caused by uncontrollable factors. Consequently, we conclude that the introduction of subjective evaluation mitigates Noise problems in incentive contracts.
Finally, measures belonging to the Financial Category, such as Profitability or Cost Savings are highly exposed to factors outside the worker's scope. As Bowens and Van Lent (2007) suggest, indicators such as profits are more dependent on exogenous factors than non-financial measures and, consequently, they are noisier. These authors state that "the primary function of disaggregated and nonfinancial measures is to reduce the noise in aggregated financial measures". For example, financial measures may be influenced by uncertainty in the environment, driven by factors such as regulatory decisions that affect competition, or by economic conditions. They also depend on the firm's decisions such as investment, on which the worker has little or no influence. The limited control of the worker hinders the motivational value of such measures (see Heneman et al. 1999) , thus affecting the intensity of the optimal incentive scheme.
Controllable Risk
Regarding Controllable Risk, Heneman et al. (1999) Productivity "are better at signalling the actions workers can take to improve overall performance and at isolating the contribution of particular workers or activities". Consequently, workers are informed about how they should behave to improve performance, and they can exert control over the actions leading to incentive increases.
As Heneman et al. (1999) also describe, employees can easily control behavioral measures. In fact, these measures are more controllable by workers than the rest of the criteria, since they can determine with precision their outcomes regarding, for example, Absenteeism or Punctuality. Overall, when employees clearly understand how their actions influence compensation, the degree of Controllable Risk increases.
Subjective evaluation commonly accounts for different dimensions of a worker's job, ranging from collaboration with other employees to the relationship with clients (see Jirjahn and Poutsma, 2013 
Impact on Firm Value
Another relevant factor concerning incentive intensity is the measure of Impact on Firm Value. Looking at the Results Category, their impact is high in comparison with other performance criteria. For example, 13 improvements in workers' productivity will eventually have an impact on organizational performance.
However, the correlation between the two variables is not perfect, since overall performance is a global result that depends on many aspects (Heneman et al., 1999) . The Results Category focuses on particular activities (such as Volume or Quality) and, consequently, they do not entirely account for all the dimensions relevant to determining global performance.
On the contrary, the contribution to firm's objectives is blurred when it comes to the HRM Outcomes Category. Despite the validity of these measures as instruments to motivate workers, they are only weakly related to organizational performance. HRM outcomes such as Punctuality or Absenteeism are very taskspecific, so they only reflect a narrow set of workers' actions. Hence, their Impact on Firm Value should be lower in comparison with other categories of indicators that represent a broader set of activities (Ittner and Larcker, 2002) .
When management uses evaluation systems based on the perceptions of a supervisor, customers, or external agencies, it is difficult to interpret their ratings in terms of organisational performance. For example, there is no direct link between subjective perceptions of collaboration between employees, or the quality of relations with customers, and organisational performance. However, on many occasions supervisors are able to provide assessments that represent firm value more accurately than certain objective measures. As Baker et al. (1994) point out, when objective criteria are difficult to determine, subjective evaluations may improve the measurement of workers' contribution to firm value, even if such subjective criteria are imperfect.
The Financial Category adds a broad set of variables and actions, accounting for a variety of dimensions of a worker's performance. Consequently, it represents organizational performance more accurately than measures of results or HRM outcomes, which are narrower and more task specific as we have already described. Therefore, any incentive scheme that uses the Financial Category links compensation to the firm's value with more precision than schemes based on other type of indicators (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999) .
Distortion
The presence of Distortion, that is, rewarding the wrong behavior, is also a relevant factor influencing incentive intensity (see Holmstron and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992 In order to solve or mitigate distortionary behavior, the theory on incentive provision suggests the use of subjective assessments substituting or complementing objective measures (see Baker et al., 1994) . The
Subjective Category allows managers to account for different dimensions of a worker's job, thus limiting the focus of workers on particular actions. Hence, their inclusion in incentive schemes could reduce the problem of Distortion. Similarly, the fact that the Financial Category does not reward particular tasks leaves less scope for Distortion. As we have already mentioned, financial indicators provide aggregate measures of performance. The idea is similar to the one presented for the Subjective Category. In both cases, measures represent a broad picture of workers' performance, which avoids workers emphasizing only particular tasks.
Manipulability
Since workers possess asymmetric information about their results, they can manipulate performance standards concerning production time or volume, and it might be difficult for managers to verify these standards. Hence, the employer has to take into account that the use of incentive schemes based on the However, it has been shown that this principle is not observed in many firms (Prendergast, 1999; Raith, 2008) . In relation to this idea, Zenger and Marshall (2000) hypothesize that increasing the number of indicators in group incentives generates problems for organizations, such as an inefficient allocation of workers' effort across several tasks. In order to avoid such problems, managers might decide to decrease incentive intensity as the number of indicators increases. However, the authors do not find empirical support for this idea.
Data and Variables
The data were collected through personal interviews with managers in Spanish manufacturing plants with 50 or more employees, and represent a unique source of information about a range of human resource practices in Spanish firms. Information was gathered at the plant level, as this is the unit at which decisions about the implementation of the HRM practices of interest are taken. Furthermore, we expected knowledge of the issues included in the questionnaire to be greater at plant level and, as a consequence, believed the data obtained would be more reliable.
The process of development of the database was as follows. Once we defined the objectives and scope of our study, we conducted a thorough examination of the literature related to our purpose in order to properly design the questionnaire. With the information gathered, members of the research group and the firm in charge of the fieldwork jointly drew up a first draft of the questionnaire. We pre-tested the questionnaire in nine plants and then modified it in several ways to come up with the final version.
Most of the information on HRM refers exclusively to blue-collar workers, that is, workers involved directly in the production process. The reason for restricting the analysis to this category of employees is the existence of a range of different internal labor markets with different features within the same organization.
Limiting the study to manual workers makes comparisons across establishments easier.
The data were drawn from personal interviews with one of the managers at the plant. We thought that questions should be addressed to the general manager or to the human resource manager. In practice we interviewed the human resource manager most frequently. The interviews with managers who agreed to respond to our questionnaire were performed by professionals with specialized training in computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The establishments were first approached by letter or email, indicating the goals of the survey and including a copy of the questionnaire.
We contacted a total of 2,933 establishments and this effort yielded 1,001 valid interviews. This final number of interviews matched expectations regarding the size of the data set, representing a response rate of 34.1%.
The data set contains exhaustive information about the use of PfP, which enables an in-depth analysis of the practice. Specifically, the questionnaire inquired about the use of general PfP, as well as about three Finally, the analysis includes a set of four controls. The first is the variable Size, which is measured as the number of employees in the establishment (see Zenger and Marshall, 2000) . This variable takes a mean value of 188.01 and a standard deviation of 467.87. The second one is Age, which represents the number of years the plant has been in operation (see Heywood and Jirjahn, 2014 Barth et al., 2008) . The mean value of
Trade Union is 2.91, and the standard deviation equals 1.15.
Results

Preliminary Analysis
Before performing the regression analysis, we examine the incidence of PfP schemes and performance measures in detail. Regarding the use of PfP schemes, 53.15 per cent of the plants in our sample report using PfP. As for the adoption of each particular scheme, Individual PfP is the most widespread (33.57 per cent of plants), followed by Group PfP (20.58 per cent) and Plant or Firm PfP (16.18 per cent). Table 5 show that, despite the variety of performance measures available, most employers base their PfP schemes on one or two measures only.
[ Table 7 displays the number of categories in our sample of establishments. We observe that, for all the [ This figure is similar for the HRM Outcomes Category, whereas it decreases significantly when it comes to the Subjective and Financial Categories. Regarding the two latter categories, more than 80 per cent of establishments use only one performance measure.
[ Table 9 depicts OLS estimations of the total intensity of PfP. The table presents five regression models, each including a different set of explanatory variables. The five models add the group of controls we have previously described: the size of the plant, its age, whether it belongs to a foreign company, and the influence of trade unions 2 . Model 1 focuses on the analysis of how the measurement level affects incentive intensity.
The coefficients for both Individual PfP and Group PfP are positive and highly significant. Hence, according to our estimations, the adoption of any of these schemes promotes incentive intensity. The magnitude of the coefficient is slightly higher for Group PfP. On the contrary, the use of Plant or Firm PfP does not seem to exert any significant influence on intensity.
[ Model 2 includes the 11 performance measures as explanatory variables in the estimated equation.
Productivity and Cost Savings are the only measures with a positive and significant effect on the strength of incentives. On the other hand, there are four measures that display negative coefficients. In particular, two of the measures belonging to the HRM Outcomes Category exert a negative effect on PfP intensity: Absenteeism and Injuries. In addition, the use of External Evaluation as a subjective measure of performance also reduces intensity according to our estimations. Finally, Profitability emerges as a negative determinant of incentive intensity in our sample of plants.
In the third model, the regressors are the four categories of measures defined in the third section. These variables represent whether at least one measure of the category is used to determine performance. What does the empirical analysis reveal about the effect of the categories of indicators? Only the Results Category emerges as a significant predictor of incentive intensity, and it displays a positive sign. The other three categories of measures have negative coefficients, but they are not statistically significant. As we have already described, this outcome could be explained by the moderate properties of the Results Category. In addition, the problems associated with the use of particular measures of the Results Category can be mitigated or eliminated if other indicators with better properties are added. As Table 8 reveals, a significant proportion of establishments use more than one measure of results, whereas this frequency is lower for other categories.
In Regarding the performance measures, the findings are also similar to those obtained in the second model.
The main differences concern Productivity, which is no longer a significant predictor of intensity, and
Subjective Evaluation, which is now negatively correlated with the variable of interest. PfP. For each scheme, we estimate two regression models with a different set of predictor variables. The first contains the 11 performance measures individually, whereas the second considers categories of measures.
The first model offers evidence supporting the influence of several measures on Individual PfP intensity. In particular, intensity increases when Productivity is used as an indicator of workers' performance. On the contrary, it decreases when the incentive scheme is based on Injuries or Subjective Evaluation. According to Model 2, the intensity of Individual PfP increases if at least one measure of results is implemented. On the contrary, the use of Subjective Evaluation exerts the opposite effect on the magnitude of this PfP scheme.
Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the impact of the measurement level and the measures used to determine performance on PfP intensity. In order to do so, we have analyzed both the three measurement levels and the sample may use more than one performance measure). Using a sample of Finnish companies, Kauhanen and Napari (2012) observe that profitability is the predominant measure for blue collar workers, followed by quality and productivity. However, it is noteworthy that these studies refer to plants in various industries, and consider a mixture of schemes that cover varied organizational units, from the entire company to subsidiaries, divisions, departments, small teams, etc.
In addition, our data reveals that Individual PfP is the most common scheme, followed by Group PfP and, finally, Plant or Firm PfP. Around fifty per cent of firms use only one measure of performance in their PfP schemes, and the adoption of more than three measures is very infrequent (around 10 per cent of firms).
Hence, despite the variety of indicators available, employers prefer to focus on very few criteria when designing their incentive schemes. As we have already mentioned, the most popular measures are those that belong to the Results Category. These findings suggest that the Informativeness Principle, the idea that any measure that adds information to incentive schemes should be used, is not supported by our analysis. Other studies have drawn different conclusions. For example, Kauhanen and Napari (2012) find that incentive schemes for blue-collar workers use, on average, four performance measures.
According to our estimation, the scheme that has the greatest impact on intensity is the one that does not present significant problems regarding any of the properties considered, that is, Group PfP. According to theory, the effectiveness of collective PfP schemes depends on their intensity (see Zenger and Marshall, 2000) . In our sample, the adoption of Plant or Firm PfP does not seem to be linked to the use of high powered incentives, so this may limit their effectiveness for increasing workers' efforts, attracting more able workers and, consequently, enhancing organizational performance. This result is also relevant because Gibbs et al. (2009) , who conclude that "the more than a measure is flawed along any of these dimensions (noise, controllable risk, distortion and manipulation), the less weight is given to that measure for explicit incentives".
Our study reflects certain caveats such as those inherent to the use of cross-section survey data. In addition, since most theoretical insights refer to the weights given to performance measures, it would be interesting to develop data sets containing such information. In this study, as in Kauhanen and Napari (2012) , Hwang et al. (2009), and Ittner and Larcker (2002) , we only observe whether a measure is used or not in an incentive scheme. Another limitation of this work is that we have developed our own characterization of measurement levels and categories of measures, but we cannot directly determine their properties. Despite these limitations, our results support the idea that the intensity of PfP is significantly related to the way performance is measured. We hope this work serves to launch further empirical research on the topic, and to develop new theoretical insights on the relationship between performance measurement and incentive intensity. 
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